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PEOPLE OF COLOR IN THE ACADEMY: 
PATTERNS OF DISCRIMINATION IN 
FACULTY IDRING AND RETENTION 
LELAND WARE* 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 25-28, 1999, a group of more than one hundred mi-
nority law professors met at John Marshall Law School in Chicago, 
Illinois. l Regional conferences of this sort have been held annually 
since 1990, but the Chicago event was the first time that the various 
conferences gathered at a single meeting. The First National Meeting 
of the Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences con-
sisted of plenary sessions, workshops, and meetings. The attendees 
reflected the growing number of Mrican-Americans, Asians, and Lati-
nos on the faculties of American law schools. That so many minority 
law professors could assemble at such an event WaS significant, but 
there was as much cause for concern as there was for celebration. De-
spite the progress that has been made during the last decade, barriers 
to entry remain: minority professors who are hired often experience 
race and gender bias at their institutions. 
The persistence of these conditions should not be surprising. I 
began my teaching career in 1987. As I prepared for my first classes, I 
read Professor Derrick Bell's And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for 
Racial justice. 2 The book consists of several "Chronicles" in which a 
narrator engages in a dialogue with an imaginary character, Geneva 
Crenshaw. One of the Chronicles highlighted the reluctance of law 
schools to make anything more than a token effort to integrate their 
faculties. Bell's main thesis was that progress toward racial equality has 
been largely symbolic despite the laws that were enacted during the 
Civil Rights era. The discussions at the 1999 Chicago meeting indicate 
* Professor, St. Louis UlliYersity School of Law. This essay is based ou a presentatiou 
that was made at the 1999 First Natioual Meetiug of the Regioual People of Color Legal 
Scholarship Coufereuces. 
1 See Elizabeth Amon, Law Schools: Chicago s Alarshall is Host to 10th },leeting of }.1il1orit)' 
Scholars, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 19, 1999, at A22. 
2 DERRICK A. BELL, AND \\'E ARE NOT SAYED: THE ELUSIYE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(Repriut ed. 1989). 
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that even with the increased number of minority professors, barriers 
to entry remain and the limited opportunities created by affirmative 
action are rapidly eroding. The quest for equality remains elusive. 
This essay considers the status of people of color in legal educa-
tion. Part I examines the organization and development of the Mid-
western People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference. This section 
explains the purpose of the Conference and describes its role in nur-
turing minority scholars. Part II discusses the development of race-
conscious scholarship. vVhell large numbers of minority students were 
admitted to colleges and universities during the late 1960s, they de-
manded that institutions reform the Eurocentric paradigm. Institu-
tions responded with the development of black studies programs or 
departments devoted to ethnic studies. As students of that era joined 
the professoriate, alternate approaches to legal scholarship emerged. 
Critical Race Theory, Critical Feminist Theory, and other forms of 
race- and gender-conscious scholarship evolved from these efforts. 
Part III shows that barriers to entry remain despite policies that 
are intended to advance faculty diversity. Many hiring committees 
continue to apply the traditional selection criteria to applicants. 
These qualifications exclude a disproportionate percentage of minor-
ity candidates and they are not absolute predictors of success in law 
teaching. Hiring committees that apply these criteria are not only ex-
cluding minority applicants who might have become outstanding 
scholars and teachers; they are exposing their institutions to liability 
under federal anti-discrimination laws. Part IV shows that many of the 
minority professors who survive the selection process are subjected to 
racial and gender bias at their institutions. This is manifested in a va-
riety of ways, including confrontations with students, racially-biased 
evaluations, and law school administrators who are indifferent to the 
unique burdens that people of color must bear. 
The final section, Part V, considers the threat posed by the cam-
paign against affirmative action that is being waged by conservative 
activists. The constitutionality of affirmative action was established 
twenty years ago when the Supreme Court decided Board of Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke.3 Since that time there have been a 
number of developments in equal protection jurisprudence; the most 
significant of which was the application of "strict scrutiny" to affirma-
tive action policies. As a result of this modification, claims of "reverse 
discrimination" are being embraced by conservative federal judges. If 
3 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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the current trend continues, when the inevitable higher education 
case reaches the Supreme Court, affirmative action could be elimi-
nated in its entirety. Contrary to the claims of affinllative action op-
ponents, however, the "color-blind" standard sets up a false dichotomy 
that treats whites and people of color as if they were similarly-situated. 
This disregards the racial disparities that are the direct product of 
decades of official discrimination. The only way in which racial ine-
qualities will be overcome is to focus on race, not to ignore it. Amer-
ica has not yet advanced to the point where color-blindness is a real 
possi bili ty. 
I. NURTURING SCHOLARS: THE MIDWESTERN PEOPLE OF COLOR LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP CONFERENCE 
In 1990, a group of professors convened the first meeting of the 
Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Loyola 
University School of Law in Chicago, Illinois. The purpose of the 
meeting was to provide a forum at which works-in-progress could be 
presented. The participants were expected to supply commentary and 
reaction to the ideas that were presented. The group was limited to 
"people of color": Mrican-Americans, Asians, and Latinos who were 
professors at law schools in the midwestern region of the United 
States. The two-and-one-half-day meeting was held over a weekend in 
February,1990.4 
The attendees ranged in years of teaching experience. At least 
one of the organizers had approximately twenty-five years of teaching 
experience. Another had a few years of teaching experience and had 
recently received tenure. Most of us, however, were untenured assis-
tant professors who were relatively new to academia. 
The early meetings were designed to aid our professional devel-
opment. The peer review process can have a chilling effect on any un-
tenured professor. The pressures on minorities are considerably en-
hanced. The organizers intended to create a supportive emironment 
in which works-in-progress could be presented without risking prema-
ture, and possibly adverse, judgments from senior faculty members. 
Their efforts were successful. The atmosphere was such that the par-
ticipants felt free to engage in a frank and candid exchange of ideas. 
4 ProfeSSOl" Linda S. Greene of the Unh"el"sity of ''''isconsin-Madison School of Law and 
Professor Norman Amaker of Loyola Unh'ersity Chicago School of Law Wel"e the organiz-
ers ofthe meeting. 
58 Boston College Third WOIld Law Journal [Vol. 20:55 
This could not have occurred as easily at the institutions where we 
were employed. 
In 1990, the number of minority law professors at American law 
schools was negligible. African-Americans and other people of color 
who were hired during this period were, by definition, outsiders. We 
endured the isolation that being the "only" person of color entails. In 
addition to the pressures that all professors experience, we shared the 
additional burdens imposed by race. We were obligated to demon-
strate our abilities to a skeptical and doubting audience. No matter 
how sympathetic or well meaning our white colleagues may have 
been, they could not have appreciated the pressures we endured. 
Many of the institutions that employed us were attempting to di-
versify their ranks, but they were not always environments in which we 
could comfortably function. If we could not describe ourselves as pio-
neers, we were, at a minimum, the first wave of settlers in an alien ter-
ritory. Many of our white students were not accustomed to dealing 
with people of color in positions of authority. At times they chal-
lenged our competency in the classroom discussions; others vented 
their hostilities in anonymous evaluations. Some of our faculty col-
leagues were more welcoming. Yet, there remained among them skep-
tics who will forever remain uncertain no matter how many articles 
are published, or how many awards are won. The Conference pro-
vided a welcome refuge from the pressures of everyday teaching. 
The meetings were structured around the presentation of works-
in-progress. Presenters submitted draft articles in advance to an or-
ganizing committee. Two or three pre-selected commentators re-
sponded to each presentation. This was followed by a general discus-
sion among the participants. Sometimes guest speakers were invited. 
On other occasions, discussions were held on teaching methodology. 
vVe inevitably discussed the unique burdens of people of color in the 
academy. A reception was held on the first evening and a dinner was 
arranged for the second day. Attendance was limited; the number of 
conferees ranged from twenty-five to thirty-five. 
The Conference meetings were rotated among law schools in the 
Midwest. The host institution provided meeting facilities and under-
wrote some of the costs of the event. The gatherings provided a forum 
for stimulating intellectual discourse. The success of the workshops 
can be measured by the other Regional Conferences that were in-
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spired by the Midwestern example,5 the scores of published articles 
that were originally presented as works-in-progress, and the number 
of participants who have been awarded tenure. 
II. TRANSFORMING THE ACADEMY: THE EMERGENCE OF RACE-
CONSCIOUS SCHOLARSHIP 
Some of the professors who have attended the Conferences pub-
lished traditional law review articles. However, much of what has been 
published can be described as "race-conscious scholarship." An ex-
ample of this approach is reflected in the writings of the Critical Race 
theorists. These scholars believe that racism is a normal component of 
American life; it is so deeply embedded that it looks ordinary and is 
often unrecognized by members of the dominant group. Civil rights 
laws are structured to redress only the most egregious acts of racial 
bias. The judiciary has imposed elaborate proof regimes for chil 
rights claims that are unusually difficult, and at times \irtually impos-
sible, to meet.6 This operates to maintain the status quo while ghing 
the appearance of advancing the cause of equality. Criticalists em-
brace "perspectivism," which relies on the personal experie\lCeS of the 
author. Their scholarship often employs personal narratives, a form of 
story-telling, to deconstruct the assumptions on which the dominant 
discourse is premised. 
The roots of race-conscious scholarship can be traced to the 
1960s, the era of the militant protests. Prior to that time, most Mri-
can-American students who attended post-secondary institutions did 
so at black colleges. Mter the formal barriers were eliminated by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was a significant increase in the num-
ber of students of color. Mfirmative action policies and minority 
scholarships created unprecedented opportunities. 
However, those of us who were beneficiaries were not always satis-
fied with our educational experiences. We sometimes found ourselves 
5 People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences haye been formed in the Northeast. 
the Mid-Atlantic. the Southwest. the Southeast. and the V'est. 
6 See. e.g .• Washington v. Da,·is. 426 U.S. 229. 242 (l9i6) (rejecting the disparate im-
pact analysis in claims asserting discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); City of Richmond y. Croson. 488 U.S. 469. 493 (1989) (apphing 
strict scrutiny standard to affIrmatiYe action programs extablished by the federal gm'ern-
ment); Shaw Y. Reno. 509 U.S. 630. 641-42 (1993) (allmdng equal protection challenges 
by non-minority voters to "m;yoIity-minoIity" yoting distIicts based on irregulaIities in the 
geographic boundaries of a congressional district); Miller y. Jolmson. 515 U.S. 900. 910-11 
(1995) (relaxing the burden of proof for non-minoIity ,'oters who assert equal protection 
challenges to redistricting legislation). 
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in environments in which we were marginalized. We were taught by 
professors who were steeped in a tradition that excluded Mrican-
Americans from the academic enterprise; their perspectives were en-
tirely Eurocentric. The works of minority scholars were missing from 
the texts that were assigned.7 
Despite our enhanced visibility in formerly all-white institutions, 
we did not find ourselves in the sort of nurturing environments that 
are conducive to academic growth. We were given receptions that 
ranged from indifference to open hostility. Institutional culpability for 
maintaining environments that promoted feelings of alienation soon 
became an issue of contention. These conditions caused progressive 
academicians to seek the transformation of the Eurocentric paradigm 
that dominated higher education. Black Studies emerged as an aca-
demic discipline because of the demands of minority students and 
faculty. Responding to these pressures, a number of colleges and uni-
versities added courses on Mrican-American thought, culture, and 
history to their curricula. The first programs, at San Francisco State 
and Cornell, were established in 1968.8 
Yale University also created a program in Black Studies in 1968.9 
A year later, the University of California at Berkeley established ethnic 
studies programs that consisted of Mro-American, Chicano, Asian-
American, and Native-American studies,lo Through the 1970s and 
1980s, several colleges and universities established similar programs. 
As students of this era entered the professoriate, alternate approaches 
began to appear; Critical Theory, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race 
Theory, and Critical Race Feminism evolved from these efforts.ll 
These new approaches to legal commentary question the assumptions 
7 For an example of how this continues to operate in legal education, see generally 
Richard Delgado. The Imperial Sehola/:' Rej1eetiolls 011 a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. 
PA. L. RE,". 561 (1984). In this article Delgado explains how minority scholars were ex-
cluded fmm academic discourse by white civil rights scholars. See generally id. They argued 
for minority rights in their writings, but they only cited the works of white scholars. See id. 
at 563. They did not cite and seemed to be unaware of the considerable body of minority 
scholarship. See id. at 561-64. 
8 See Chandra Talpade Mohant)·, On Race alld 1 'aiee: Challenges for Liberal Education ill the 
1990s, ill BETWEEN BORDERS: PEDAGOGY AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL STUDIES 145, 149 
(Henry A. Gimux & Peter l\IcLal'en eds .• 1994). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See gelleralZl', e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEy WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
l\IOYEMEN.T (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING 
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed .• 1995); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Kather-
ine Wing ed .• 1997). 
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implicit in the dominant discourse. By adding different voices to the 
discussion, race conscious scholarship has added perspectives that 
were missing from the marketplace of ideas. 
III. BARRIERS TO ENTRY: THE AnYERSE IMPACT OF THE TRADITIONAL 
SELECTION CRITERIA 
The voices of minority scholars have added a new dimension to 
academic discourse. Yet, artificial and unnecessary barriers continue 
to impede the hiring of people of color. Furthermore, the few who 
are chosen are not always comfortable with what they find. In 1988, 
Professor Richard Chused published the findings of a survey that ex-
amined the hiring and retention of minorities and women on Ameri-
can law school faculties.12 Chused found that at majority-operated law 
schools, African-Americans constituted 3.7% of the faculty; Latinos 
represented 0.7%; and other minorities 1.0%.13 Chused concluded 
that the data showed that "minority professors in general, and black 
professors in particular, tend to be tokens if they are present at all; 
that very few majority-run schools have significant numbers of minor-
ity teachers; and that minority teachers leave their schools at higher 
rates than do their white colleagues. "14 
During 1986--87, Professor Richard Delgado conducted a survey 
to determine the level of job satisfaction that existed among minority 
professors.15 Several of the respondents reported a decline in chili!:). 
at their schools. 16 A high percentage of the indhiduals surveyed de-
scribed their institutions as racist, approximately half were experienc-
ing severe job stress, and more that one-tenth were considering re-
signing from their positions.l' The Chused and Delgado surveys 
revealed the negligible number of minorities on law school faculties 
and found an unusually low level of morale among those who were 
employed. 
12 See gelleraIZ)' Richard A. Chused. The Hirillg alld Ri'tention of ,\1inorities and HOlllen on 
American Law School Faculties. 137 U. PA. L. REy. 537 (1988). 
13 See id. at 539-48; see also Michael A. Olh·as. The Ed1lcation of Latino Lawyers: .1.11 Essay 
all Crop Cultivatioll. 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REy. 117. 128 (1994) (discussing the negligible 
nUlnbel' of Latinos. including 22 law teachers in 1982 and. as of 1994. only 1.5% of all fac-
ultvand 1.1 % when all tenured faculty are considered). 
14 Chused. supra note 12. at 539. 
15 See gelleral()' Richard Delgado and Derrick Bell. Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-
Delgado Survl?)', 24 HARY. C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 349 (1989). 
16 See id. at 352. 
17 See id. at 352-53. 
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Notwithstanding the stated commitment of many institutions to 
affirmative action hiring policies, the number of minority faculty 
members remains low. The relative absence of people of color from 
law school faculties was explained in a 1986 article authored by Char-
les R. Lawrence. IS Professor La\vTence identified the obstacles that 
exclude minorities in the hiring process.l9 These included a degree 
from a top-ranked law school, high class rank,· service as an editor on 
a law review, a judicial clerkship, or an association with a prestigious 
law firm.20 Lawrence also found that an "old boys' network" existed in 
which candidates were referred to appointments committees by indi-
viduals known to the members.21 
Minority law school graduates rarely possess all of the attributes 
that Lawrence identified. They are outside of the "old boys' network." 
The traditional qualifications exclude a disproportionate number of 
minority applicants. There also is no data that demonstrates that these 
qualifications are reliable predictors of success in law teaching. In 
fact, many senior professors, especially those at less prestigious law 
schools, did not possess these qualifications when they were hired.22 
Consequently, these criteria are not prerequisites to success in law 
school teaching. Practices such as these violate Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act under the disparate impact theory. 
A. The Disparate Impact of the Traditional Hiring Criteria 
Under the disparate impact theory, neutral selection criteria that 
exclude a disproportionate percentage of minority applicants are un-
lawful unless they are supported by a "business necessity." This means 
that the qualifications must bear a demonstrable relationship to suc-
cessful job performance. The disparate impact theory was developed 
in one of the Supreme Court's earliest employment discrimination 
decisions, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.23 Prior to the effective date of Title 
VII of the Civil Righ ts Act of 1964, the employer in Griggs restricted its 
black employees to its lower-paying jobs.24 Mter Title VII became ef-
fective in 1965, the formal racial barriers were removed, but access to 
18 See generally Charles R. Lawrellce III, Atinority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for 
lolltntm~\' Qllotas. 20 U.S.F. L. RH. 429 (1986). 
19 See id. at 432-37. 
20 See id. at 432-33. 
21 See id. at 435-36. 
22 See id. at 434. 
23 401 U.S. 424 (1971), revg420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1971). 
24 See id. at 42~27. 
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the higher-paying positions became conditioned on a high school di-
ploma and a passing score on two standardized tests.25 These new re-
quirements operated to exclude a high percentage of the black appli-
cants.26 The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that liability 
could not be established without a showing that the employer had a 
subjective intent to discriminate against minorities.27 In what became 
a much-quoted passage, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that 
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral 
in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."28 If a 
facially neutral practice had a discriminatory effect, a plaintiff was not 
required to prove discriminatory 1ll0tive.29 
The Supreme Court based its decision in Griggs on its interpreta-
tion of the goals of Title VII, which required, among other things, the 
"removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the ba-
sis of racial or other impermissible classification. "30 In Griggs, the e\i-
dence showed that the employer had not made any attempt to 
correlate standardized tests to job perfonnance.31 The company's 
white employees, who had neither graduated from high school nor 
taken the examinations were able to perform the jobs in question.32 
This ability to perform showed that the selection criteria, which ex-
cluded black applicants, were not related to successful job perform-
ance.33 The Court found that newly imposed requirements ,iolated 
Title VII; proof of intent to discriminate was not required.34 
Four years after the Griggs decision, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the job-relatedness standard. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. A1oody, 
the employer required applicants for skilled positions to have a high 
school diploma and to pass two standardized tests. 35 As in Gliggs, the 
diploma and examination requirements in Albemarle excluded a dis-
25 See id. at 42i-28. 
26 See id. at 428. 
27 See id. at 429. 
28 See id. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430. 
29 See id. at 432. 
30 See id. at 43l. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 431-32. 
33 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
34 See id. at 436. 
35 See 422 U.S. 405, 410-11 (l9i5). 
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proportionate number of minority applicants.36 Mter a civil action was 
filed, the employer attempted to validate the examinations using the 
EEOC guidelines that the Court endorsed in Griggs.37 When Albemarle 
reached the Supreme Court, the majority found that the validation 
studies were flawed. 38 They did not compare the examinations that 
employers used to the skills required for the jobs in question.39 Mter 
reaching this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Griggs 
"that Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discrimina-
tory in effect unless the employer meets the 'burden of showing that 
any given requirement [has] ... a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question. "'40 The Court ruled against the employer after 
finding that this requirement had not been satisfied.41 . 
Albemarle firmly established the order and allocation of proof in 
disparate impact cases. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by 
showing that an employment practice disproportionately excluded 
members of a protected group.42 Once the plaintiff satisfies this bur-
den, the employer is required to demonstrate that the practice had a 
"manifest relationship" to the jobs involved.43 If the employer satisfies 
its burden, a plaintiff can prevail by showing that other equally effec-
tive selection devices, which would not produce a disparate impact, 
are available to serve the employer's legitimate interest in hiring 
qualified workers.44 
36 See id. at 43l. 
3; See 402 U.S. at 430-31; 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978). In Albemarle, the Com-t intel"preted 
the EEOC guidelines as prohibiting discriminatory tests unless it can be shown ''by profes-
sionally acceptable methods." that the tests are ·'predictive of or significantly cOlTeiated 
"ith important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or 
jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.'" 422 U.S. at 43l. 
38 Sec 422 U.S. at 435. 
39 Sec id. at 432-33. 
40/d. at 425. 435-36 (quoting Griggs. 401 U.S. at 432). 
41 See id. at 436. 
-l2 See id. at 425. A plima facie case is made through a demonstration tllat the qualifica-
tions imposed cause the employel' to select applicants "in a racial pattern that is signifi-
cantly different f!'Om that of the pool of applicants." ld. 
43 See Albemarle. 422 U.S. at.425. 
44 See id. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas COl'p. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973». 
In natson v. Forth north Bank and Trust, the Supreme Court held tllat the disparate impact 
analysis applies to subjective hiring Cl'iteria. See 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). The disparate 
impact standard was codified by the Chil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
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B. Academic Freedom and Judicial Review of Faculty Hiring Decisions 
The application of the disparate impact analysis to faculty hiring 
decisions must be examined in the context of the unique considera-
tions of academic freedom that apply to faculty decision making. In 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, Justice Frankfurter emphasized "the four es-
sential freedoms of a university-to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, 
and who may be admitted to study. "45 These principles have insulated 
the faculty selection and promotion process from judicial scrutiny. In 
discrimination cases, courts have been reluctant to second-guess fac-
ulty evaluations since they involve determinations of "who may teach." 
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cautions, "[o]f all 
fields which federal courts should be hesitant to invade and take over, 
education and faculty appointments at a [u]niversity level are proba-
bly the least suited for federal court supervision."46 Deferring to aca-
demic decision-making, some courts have held that the peer-review 
process used to select and promote faculty members satisfies the busi-
ness necessity requirement under the disparate impact analysis. 
For example, in Scott v. University of Delaware, an African-American 
professor joined the Sociology Department at the University of Dela-
ware in 1971 after eleven years of teaching at other institutionsY In 
1973, the faculty voted to terminate his contract.48 The decision v.'as 
based on complaints about Scott's teaching and lack of scholarly pub-
lications.49 Scott sued, alleging that he had been the victim of race 
discrimination.50 Scott argued, among other things, that the Univer-
sity's Ph.D. requirement had a disparate impact on African-American 
45 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, j., concurring). See also Keyishian y. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967) (holding New lark statute proYisions and adlllinis-
trative procedures baITing or disqualif)lng elllployees based on teaching certain doctrine 
unconstitutional); Academic Freedom and Tenure, 1940 BULL. &1. ASS'N U. PROFESSORS, Feb. 
1942, at 84. 
46 Faro v. New lark Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Regents of the 
Univ. of Mich. Y. E,dng, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (stating that courts should defer to the 
judglllent of the academics and should not OYertUril such decisions unless they are such "a 
substantial departure frolll accepted academic norllls as to delllonstrate that the person or 
committee did not actually exercise professional judglllent "). 
4i See 455 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (D. Del. 1978), rella 011 othergrollllds, 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cil. 
1979). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirllled the portion of the district court's 
holding that the University's basis for not rene\\lng Scott's contract was not racial aniulUs. 
Scottv. L'l1iv. of Del. , 601 F.2d 76, 81 (3d Cil. 1979). 
48 See Scott, 455 F. Supp. at 1118. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 1117. 
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candidates.51 The court found that this requirement probably had a 
disparate impact on minority applicants, but it satisfied the job-
relatedness requirement.52 There was an adequate relationship, it 
held, between the degree requirement and the duties of professors at 
research institutions.53 
In another case, Cmpenter v. Board of Regents of University of Wiscon-
sin S."Ystem, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a 
university's tenure requirements were job-related.54 Carpenter was a 
professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the Mrican-
American Studies Department.55 He was denied tenure based on defi-
ciencies in his record of scholarly publications.56 Carpenter's position 
in the newly established Mrican-American Studies Department im-
posed heavier administrative burdens on him than other untenured 
professors.57 Carpenter also had more counseling responsibilities than 
similarly-situated white professors because of the special needs of mi-
nority students at a predominately white university.58 These obliga-
tions, he argued, interfered 'with his efforts to produce scholarly re-
search.59 The Seventh Circuit held that Carpenter had not established 
a prima facie case because it found that his evidence of adverse impact 
was speculative.60 The court also found that even if a disparate impact 
had been shmvn, the University's tenure requirements-teaching, 
scholarship, and community service-were job-related.61 
Scott and Cmpenter illustrated the courts' reluctance to scrutinize 
the academic judgments of faculty committees. In both cases, the 
courts accepted the institutions' arguments without a thorough 
evaluation of factors that the business necessity standard requires. 
However, a careful examination of the selection criteria identified in 
the La\\TenCe article reveals that they do not satisi)' the business ne-
cessity standard even if the heavier burden imposed by the principle 
of "academic deference" is applied. Success in law teaching is meas-
51 See id, at 1123. 
52 See id. at 1126. 
53 See Scott, 455 F. Supp. at 1126. 
54 Seei28 F.2d 911, 914 (ith Cil. 1984). 
55 See id. at 912. 
56 See id. at 913. 
57 See id. at 912-13. 
58 See id. at 913. 
59 See CmpelJtel~ i28 F.2d at 915. 
60 See id. at 914-15. 
61 See id. at 915; see also Zahorik y. Cornell Uniy., i29 F.2d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding 
that facult\, selection process, which relied hea\'ilv on the selective judgment of scholars, 
was job-related). 
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ured primarily by teaching ability, publication in scholarly journals, 
and community service. Graduation from a top-ranked law school, an 
editorial position on a law re\iew, high class rank, and a judicial clerk-
ship are desirable attributes, but there is no empirical evidence that 
shows that these qualifications are closely correlated to the critical job 
functions of a law professor or that they are reliable predictors of suc-
cess in law school teaching. 
In Law School Riling Under Title VII, Professor Norman Redlich 
questioned the use of the traditional hiring criteria and suggested 
that they might be discriminatory.62 Redlich's article consists of a hy-
pothetical opinion in which a law school's summary judgment motion 
was denied in a disparate impact case.63 He rehearsed all of the argu-
ments that would be made for and against the traditional hiring crite-
ria.64 Redlich concluded that there were, at minimum, genuine issues 
of fact concerning the job-relatedness of the traditional qualific.a-
tions.65 He also suggested that there were other equally effective ways 
of identifYing facuity, including examining a candidate's practice ex-
perience and considering other post-law school acthities.66 Redlich 
stopped short of a conclusive finding that the traditional hiring crite-
ria are discriminatory, but he noted that "some senior ... scholars, 
who have contributed to the school's scholarly reputation, would be 
screened out if the present standards were applied. "67 Professor Red-
lich's polite warning underestimates the weight of this e\idence. Like 
the white factory workers in G~iggs, the senior faculty members to 
whom Redlich refers were grandfathered in under a different set of 
selection standards. Their proliferation on law school faculties dem-
onstrates that the traditional qualifications do not predict success in 
law school teaching. 
Professor Derrick Bell, in Diversity and Academic Freedom, noted 
that the opposition to minority candidates who have nontraditional 
qualifications or nontraditional ways of teaching "can be as fierce as it 
is illogical and unfair."68 He points out that not all those with tradi-
62 See gelleraIZ)' Norman Redlich, Law School Faculty Hiling ['nder Title HI: How a Judge 
Might Decide a Disparate Impact Case, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 135 (1991). 
63 See id. at 135. 
64 See id. at 137-39. 
65 See id. at 139. 
66 Seeid. at 137. 
6i See Redlich, supra note 62, at 138. See generally, e.g. Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Plu-
ralist Case for Affirmative Action ill Legal Academia. 1990 DUKE LJ. 705: Elyce H. Zenott & 
Jerome A. Barron, So lolt ltlmt to Hire a ProfessOl; 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 492 (1983). 
68 Derrick A. Bell, Diversity and Academic Freedom. 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3il, 374 (1993). 
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tional backgrounds have generated the "quality and quantity of schol-
arship that their grades were supposed to predict. "69 Professor Bell 
concludes that the traditional standards provide a "clear exclusionary 
effect ... on both minorities and whites who have the potential for 
excellen t teaching and scholarship. "70 
This is not a brief for lowering academic standards. The critical 
point is that the traditional criteria cannot be used as the exclusive 
means of screening applicants. There are other equally effective ways 
of selecting law school faculty. The latitude afforded by academic 
freedom does not prevent courts from examining faculty selection 
and tenure practices. Recent discrimination cases indicate that the 
rate at which faculty plaintiffs prevail is starting to increase. As Wil-
liam Kaplan and Barbara Lee explained, "[c]ourts will defer to insti-
tutions' expert judgment concerning scholarship, teaching, and other 
educational qualifications if ... those judgments are fairly reached, 
but the courts ·will not subject institutions to a more deferential stan-
dard of review or a lesser obligation to repair the effects of discrimi-
nation."71 Academic freedom should not mask "artificial arbitrary and 
unnecessary barriers" that operate to preserve the status quo. Faculty 
members who cling to the traditional qualifications are doing more 
than excluding minority candidates who might have been outstanding 
teachers and scholars; they are exposing their institutions to liability 
under Title VII. 
IV. OBSTACLES INSIDE INSTITUTIONS 
All schools do not rigidly apply the traditional selection criteria. 
This is demonstrated by the increase in the number of minority pro-
fessors at majority schools since 1987 when the Chused survey was 
published.72 But, the modest advance in numbers has not eliminated 
the patterns of racial bias ·within educational institutions. This is re-
flected in confrontations with hostile students, racially-biased evalua-
69ld. 
70 Id. 
71 WILLIAM A KAPLAN & BARBARA A LEE. THE LAw OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A COM-
PREHENSIYE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF AoMINISTRATIYE DECISION MAKING 215 
(3d eel. 1995). 
72 See Richard A. \\11ite. A.ssociation o/A.merican Law Schools Statistical RRport on Law School 
Faculty 1997-98 (yisited l\lar. 19. 1999) <http://www.aals.Ol'g/ statistics/t2b9798.html>. 
The 1997-98 slllTey indicates that minorities constituted 9% of all law school professOl·s. 
See id. Unlike the Chused study, this sun-ey includes the four historically-black law schools. 
See id. If full-time tenured and tenure-track positions at m~ol"ity law schools were consid-
ered. a far lower percentage would be shown. See id. 
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tions, and indifferent administrators. In a recent article, Professor 
Reginald Robinson described unpleasant confrontations ",ith stu-
dents, unresponsive administrators, and colleagues who undermined 
his credibility by ridiculing his teaching style.73 After analyzing his ex-
periences, Professor Robinson concluded that he was penalized be-
cause he brought a racial perspective to his courses. 74 
In Silent Screams from Within the Academy: Let My Peo/)Ie Grow, Pro-
fessor Peter Alexander explained that minority professors are forced 
to deal with issues of "aloneness, lack of support, and fear by a dug-in 
majority that often views minorities as necessary affirmative action 
hires or diversity or token appointments. "i5 Alexander believes that 
many of these issues are not adequately addressed because of a lack of 
dialogue among minority professors and law school administrators. 76 
In Who is Black Enough for lou? An Analysis of Northwestern University 
Law School's Struggle Over Minmity Faculty Hiling, Professor Leonard 
Baynes discussed burdens imposed on minority law professors, "such 
as mentoring students of color and junior faculty of color, sening as 
the representative voice of people of color on various faculty commit-
tees, and interacting with the larger community of color. "77 Baynes 
contended that these time-consuming and burdensome obligations 
weigh hea\ily on minority professors.78 He noted further that some of 
these difficulties are shared by minority students who are expected to 
serve as the campus representatives of all minorities. 79 
African-American and other non-white females also experience 
"intersectional discrimination." This combination of bias, which is not 
experienced by minority males or white females, results from the 
unique combination of race and sex.80 In On Being a Gorilla in IOllr 
Midst, Professor Jennifer Russell described a pattern of intersectional 
discrimination that began when a picture of a gorilla was anony-
;3 See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching jimn the },iargins: Race as a Pedagogical S1Ib-
text, 19 W. NE'" ENG. L. RE\,. 151, 151-52 (l99i). 
74 See id. at 181. 
;5 Peter C. Alexander, SilRnt Screams jiom Within the Academy: Let "~\' Peo/Jle Grow, 59 
OHIO ST. LJ. 1311, 1311 (1998). 
;6 See id. at 1328-29. 
;; Leonard 1\1. Bavnes, n710 is Blach En01lgh for 101l? A.n AnaZ\'sis of.Yorthwcstrl'l1 Cniversity 
Law School's StrugglR Over Minorit)'Faculty Hhing, 2 MICH.]. R.\.CE & L. 205, 225 (l99i). 
78 See id. at 225 n.91. 
79 See id. 
80 See genemlZ1' Kimbede Crenshaw, Dcmmginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Blach 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Them)', and A.ntimcist Politics, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 
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mously placed in her faculty mailbox.81 Professor Russell found that 
many of her white students were unwilling to accept her position of 
authority.82 They questioned her abilities and assumed that she was an 
unqualified "affirmative action" hire.83 In Just My 'Magination, Profes-
sor Okainer Christian Dark described unpleasant encounters and bi-
ased student evaluations.8ol Students questioned Professor Dark's 
knowledge of the subject matter of her classes.85 A first-year student 
\isited her office and offered her advice on how she should teach.86 
\Vhen Professor Dark complained, administrators dismissed her con-
cerns as figments of her imagination.87 
In Two Steps Removed: The Paradox of Diversity Discourse of Women of 
Color in Law Teaching, Professor Donna Young described similar epi-
sodes of intersectional discrimination.88 In one instance, a white stu-
dent approached Professor Young with suggestions as to how she 
should conduct her classes.89 Another student, who had been friendly, 
became openly hostile after receiving his grade.90 Throughout the rest 
of the semester, the student sat directly in front of Professor Young, 
stared at her, and leapt at every opportunity to contradict her state-
ments.91 Professor Young suggested that the student's hostility 
stemmed from his "ambiguity ... about [her] place within the law 
school hierarchy. ''92 
Professor Young reported that some of her students displayed 
sexist attitudes.93 She recalled an incident in which a student stated, 
during an informal gathering of students and faculty, that he pre-
ferred to refer to her as "babe.''9ol On a separate occasion, the same 
81 See Jennifer M. Russell. On Being a Gorilla in lour Midst, or, The Life of Olle Blackwoman 
in the Legal A.eadem),. ill CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 498, 498-99 (Richard 
Delgado ed .• 1995). 
82 See id. at 500. 
83 See id. 
84 See Okainer Christian Dark, just M)' ~VIagination. 10 HARV. BLAcKLETTER J. 21, 23 
(1993). 
85 See id. at 24-25. 
86 See id. at 26. 
87 See id. at 28-29. 
88 Donna E. ):oung, Two Steps Remaved: The Paradox of Diversity Discourse of Women of Color 
ill Law Teaching, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 270, 272-76 (1996). 
89 See id. at 280. 
90 See id. at 279-80. 
91 See id. at 28l. 
92 See id. at 280. 
93 See Young, supra note 88, at 282. 
94 See id. at 282. 
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student approached Professor Young and addressed her as "babe" as 
he motioned her to a seat.95 
Professor Young also reported other efforts to demean and objec-
tify minority females.96 She recounted an episode in which several fe-
male professors at Rutgers were victims of an "incident ... where stu-
dents disseminated racist/sexist flyers referring to certain female 
professors of color. "97 The flyers were 'Justified by one student as be-
ing a legitimate protest to the 'multicultural atmosphere that per-
vades the institution at the expense of quality education.' "98 
Similar experiences are described by other women of color. In an 
article released posthumously, Tenure and Alinority Law Professors: SejJa-
rating the Strands, Professor Trina Grillo described the difficulties that 
minority females are required to endure.99 She reported that women 
of color are subjected to racist and sexist comments that adversely af-
fect their teaching, writing, and interactions 'with colleagues. 1OO She 
also complained about her heavy workload, poor teaching evalua-
tions, unduly harsh criticisms of her scholarly work, and the "floating 
standard" for hiring and tenure decisions.l° l 
Incidents like these have been described at every meeting of the 
Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference. The pro-
liferation of such stories indicates that incidents of race and gender 
bias are not isolated events. Minority professors are subjected to en-
counters with hostile students. Other students make it clear that they 
are unwilling to accept them as competent professionals. Minority 
professors receive race- and gender-biased student evaluations, which 
weigh heavily in promotion and tenure decisions. Faculty colleagues 
are often unwilling to recognize the unique burdens that minority 
professors must bear. These conditions are more than the minor frus-
trations and annoying episodes that all junior faculty experience. The 
reality is that many professors of color are subjected to different and 
less favorable treatment than similarly-situated whites. Institutions that 
respond with indifference are, by their inaction, compounding the 
problem. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 283. 
97Id. at 289. 
98 Young. supra note 88, at 289. 
99 See Trilla Grillo. Tenure and Minority nomen Law Professors: Separating the Strands, 31 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 747. 747 (1997). 
100 See id. at 749. 
101 See id. at 753-54. 
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V. CLOSING THE DOORS TO MINORITIES: THE ASSAULT ON 
AFFIRMA TIVE ACTION 
The progress made by people of color in legal education is 
threatened by the war that is being waged against affirmative action by 
conservative activists. When the first meeting of the Midwestern Peo-
ple of Color Conference convened in 1990, neo-conservative voices 
were becoming a considerable force in public policy discussions. Dur-
ing the Reagan and Bush administrations, federal judges were ap-
pointed based upon a conservative philosophy that included, among 
other things, opposition to affirmative action. 
The result of this effort was reflected in a shift in the Supreme 
Court's approach to chil rights cases. During the 1988-89 term, a se-
ries of decisions were issued in chil rights cases which signaled a dra-
matic shift in the Court's direction. The most significant of these deci-
sions, City of Richmond v. Croson, applied strict scrutiny to state-
sponsored affirmative action programs.102 In a series of cases begin-
ning \\ith Board of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams, but a m~ority of the justices could not reach a consensus as to 
the relevant analytical framework. 103 The debate centered on whether 
strict scrutiny should apply to affirmative action since it was designed 
to benefit, rather than disadvantage, racial minorities.104 In Croson, a 
majority agreed, for the first time, to apply strict scrutiny.105 Pursuant 
to this standard, official actions that employ racial classifications must 
be justified by a "compelling state interest" and the means chosen 
must be "narrowly tailored" to achieving the goals of the policy.106 
During the 1950s and 1960s, strict scrutiny was the principal mecha-
nism that was used to invalidate state-sponsored discrimination. In the 
segregation cases, strict in theory always means fatal in fact. The ques-
tion now is how affirmative action programs mll fare under the exact-
ing requirements of strict scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court has not addressed affirmative action in the 
context of higher education since it decided Bakke, but lower court 
decisions applying strict scrutiny reflect a developing pattern. Relying 
on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, most universities have relied on 
102 See 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
103 See 438 U.S. 265, 324-421 (1978). 
104 See id. 
105 See 488 U.S. at 493. 
106 See id. at 500. 
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diversity as the justification for their affirmative action programs. lOi In 
Podberesky v. Kirwan, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
struck down a race-targeted scholarship program that was intended to 
increase the number of minority students who attended the University 
of Maryland.lo8 The Court held that Maryland had not shown a his-
tory of discrimination and that the scholarship program was not nar-
rowly tailored to achieving the goal of increasing the minority student 
population. 109 
Diversity was not directly addressed in Podbereshy, but in Hojnvood 
v. Texas, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated an af-
firmative action admissions program that was used by the University of 
Texas.no In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit held that diversity is a valid con-
sideration in admission decisions, but race is not a proxy for diver-
sity.lll In Wessman v. Gittens, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
applied strict scrutiny to invalidate an affirmative action program that 
was used by Boston Latin, a prestigious, publicly-financed high school 
in Boston.ll2 Like the Fifth Circuit in Hojnvood, the First Circuit in 
Wessman rejected the diversity rationale that the city offered.ll3 
The opponents of affirmative action invoke "color blindness" to 
support their interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. However, 
their arguments discount the continuing effects of official segrega-
tion. An obvious example of this is the pattern of racial segregation 
that persists despite the Fair Housing Act of 1968. I was reminded of 
this when I decided to pursue a career in legal education in the late 
1980s. I attended the Association of American Law Schools recruit-
ment conference in Chicago where I had several interviews. Law pro-
10i See 438 U.S. at 311-12. In arguing for the application of strict scrutim' in Bahhe,Jus-
tice Powell found that the elimination of racial discrimination ,,'ould pwyide an adequate 
justification for the deyelopment of an affinnatiye action pwgram. See id. He also belieyed 
that the goal of attaining student body diYel'sit\' was "clearly constitutionally permissible," 
Id. 
108 See 38 F.3d147, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1994). mt. delliI'd, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
109 See id, 
110 See 78 F.3d 932. 962 (5th Cil'.). 1'1'11 'g delliI'd. 84 F.3d 720 (Sth Cir.). cert. denied, 518 
U.S. 1033 (1996). 
111 See id. at 948. 
112 See 160 F.3d 790. 808 (1 st Cir. 1998). 
113 See id. at 797. The courts ha\'e not been the onl\, fwnt on which battles are fought. 
A California ballot measure, Pwposition 209. outlawed affinnath'e action ill that state. A 
similar meaSUl'e was adopted by Yotel'S in the state of ""ashington. These are not fortuitous 
occulTences; the" are the product of cal'efull" coordinated and ,,'ell-financed campaigns b\' 
conseryati\,e acthists. See. e.g .• Michael S. Greye. The Demise of Race-Based A.dmissioll Policies. 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC .. Mar. 19. 1999. at 136. Greye's organization. the Center for Incli-
yidual Rights, represented the plaintiffs in Podberesily, HOjJ1oood. and Hessman, 
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fessors are familiar with the process. The candidate is picked up at the 
airport and driven to a local hotel. There is a dinner with a small 
group of faculty members on the first evening. The next day the can-
didate \isits the law school and meets the rest of the faculty. 
At some point during the visit, the applicant is given a tour of the 
city, which includes \isits to neighborhoods where the candidate 
might choose to reside. During my on-campus visits to various locali-
ties, I never saw any Mrican-Americans except for the few who were 
employed by the host institution (and that was rare). I was never 
shown black neighborhoods, although I knew they existed-some-
where. This absence of Mrican-Americans struck me as odd since 
there were substantial minority populations in every location that I 
\isited. I realized eventually that this is what was intended by segrega-
tion. Mrican-Americans resided in some remote area of the city, iso-
lated from the communities that were shown to me. This was a stark 
reminder of the pervasive effects of segregation twenty years after the 
official policy was outlawed. 
Conditions now are no different. Segregated housing patterns 
create segregated schools. Segregated schools provide diminished 
learning opportunities. Poor educational preparation prevents minor-
ity students from competing effectively for jobs. The arguments of 
affirmative action opponents proceed as if these conditions do not 
exist. They discount entirely the history and legacy of official segrega-
tion and the vestiges that continue to haunt us. 
Strict scrutiny was originally developed to protect "discrete and 
insular" minorities from the excesses of majoritarian governmental 
policies. Unlike the invidious discrimination reflected in "whites only" 
ordinances, affirmative action was developed to ameliorate the condi-
tions that segregation caused. This distinction was discarded when the 
majority in Cmson placed affirmative action policies on the same ana-
lytical foundation as segregation statutes. If the present trend contin-
ues, when the inevitable education case reaches the Supreme Court, 
the result could be the elimination of affirmative action. However, 
thirty years of antidiscrimination laws have not eliminated the effects 
of three centuries of discrimination. Rather than advancing the cause 
of racial equality, a "color blind" standard in this context will simply 
prolong the racial hierarchy that persists. 
CONCLUSION 
The question for the twenty-first century is whether universities 
will continue to operate as white institutions where token numbers of 
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minontIes are allowed to participate or whether they will become 
academic communities to which all citizens are afforded equal access. 
This essay has shown that the unique burdens that minority scholars 
must bear are no different in 1999 than they were in 1989. Barriers to 
entry remain and the limited opportunities created by affirmative ac-
tion are rapidly eroding. Those who are hired continue to experience 
race and gender bias at their institutions. 
There are, of course, many episodes of overt racism that occur on 
a regular basis. This overt racism is reflected in the behavior that 
ranges from vicious hate crimes to petty insults. However, much of the 
discrimination that occurs today takes place at a subconscious level 
and the actor is unaware of the forces that influence his conduct. 114 As 
one commentator noted, unconscious racism "is learned, internal-
ized, and used without awareness of the source. "115 This is why indi-
viduals who consider themselves supporters of equality engage in 
conduct that disadvantages people of color. Professor Kimberle Cren-
shaw has described this phenomenon as the continuing influence of 
the ''white norm. "116 She explains that the explicit assertion of white 
supremacy ended with the Jim Crow era, when official acts of dis-
crimination were outlawed.1l7 ''The white norm, however, has not dis-
appeared; it has only been submerged in the popular consciousness. 
It continues in an unspoken form as a statement of a positive social 
norm, legitimizing the continuing domination of those who do not 
meet it. "118 
In the case of faculty hiring, much of the bias against people of 
color operates at this unconscious level. It is hidden by "objective" 
standards that are used to denote merit and academic accomplish-
ment. But tllese standards are not objective; they are often as much a 
reflection of an individual's economic status and social background as 
they are an accurate measure of potential. Hiring committees may not 
be aware of the subconscious forces that affect their decision-making, 
but tllese influences are evident in the results of their recruitment 
efforts. 
114 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego. and Equal Protection: RRclwllillg "'itll L'1l-
consciotts Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 338 (1987). 
115 Id. at 343. 
116 See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race. RR/OI'III, alld RRtl'ellchlllent: Trans/ol'matioll and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law. 101 HARY. L. RE,'. 1331. 1377-79 (1988). 
117 See id. 
118Id. at 1379. 
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The end of the official regime of racial discrimination in the 
1960s did not eliminate the cultural bias that perpetuates the white 
norm. The belief held by many that with the passage of time the ves-
tiges of segregation will disappear is a flawed premise. The problem is 
far deeper and more entrenched than many individuals realize or are 
willing to admit. It is obvious, often painfully so, to those who must 
suffer the consequences. As long as discrimination is dismissed as the 
aberrational conduct of racists, meaningful reform will not begin. 
